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Standoff Between India and Pakistan 
by Peter Lavoy and Surinder Rana 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 
Government. 
February/March 2002 
On December 13, 2001 the Indian parliament was attacked by terrorists who India claimed belonged to 
two Pakistan-based militant outfits: Lashkar-e- Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). [1] Pakistan's 
government denied that any groups based in its country carried out the attacks. Despite this denial, a 
number of Indian political leaders urged their government to take strong action against Pakistan. Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpai's administration ordered mobilization of the military and demanded that 
Pakistan eliminate militant groups operating against India from Pakistani territory, and in Kashmir. Prime 
Minister Vajpai further announced that India will respond to this act of terrorism, and that the use of 
military force will be one possible option. [2] Pakistan in turn mobilized its army. At present the two armies 
are facing each other across the Line of Control in Kashmir and along the 2,200 mile international border 
in Punjab, Rajsthan, and Gujarat.  
This is the first time since 1971 that both countries are actually poised for war with one another. Earlier 
mobilizations of the two armies -- in 1987 and 1990 -- were different in scale, because the strike elements 
of each force were not fully activated, and no landmines were deployed. Reports suggest that in the 
current situation both countries have activated their strategic nuclear assets. [3]  
With a view to increasing pressure on Pakistan's President Parvez Musharraf to act against the terrorist 
groups operating from Pakistani territory, India has recalled its high commission from Islamabad and 
reduced its diplomatic staff by 50 percent. India also stopped bus and train service between the two 
countries, and banned use of its air space by Pakistani air assets. Trade between India and Pakistan also 
has been stopped. Though Pakistan has not recalled its high commission from New Delhi, it has 
otherwise responded to India's actions by cutting its diplomatic staff in New Delhi, and denying its 
airspace to Indian air assets. There has been a perceptible increase in firing across the Line of Control 
from both sides. [4] 
Prime Minister Vajpai and President Musharraf attended a meeting among heads of state of the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), held in Kathmandu, Nepal, on 4-6 January 2002. 
Foreign ministers of the two countries also met on the side during the SAARC summit. Although these 
meetings did not result in a substantive dialogue between the two governments, statements made to the 
media by both leaders indicated a mutual desire for reconciliation and a defusing of the crisis. Pakistan 
has asked for a resumption of dialogue with India. The Vajpai government, however, has set conditions 
for the resumption of talks that include: 1) the arrest and extradition of 20 individuals, many of whom are 
Indian nationals residing in Pakistan, named as terrorists on a list provided by India to the Musharraf 
government; 2) closure of facilities, training camps, arms supply routes, funding channels, and all direct 
and indirect assistance to terrorists operating from Pakistan's soil; 3) an end to the infiltration of arms and 
men from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir; and 4) a "categorical and unambiguous renunciation" of 
terrorism in all its manifestations.[5]  
In response, Pakistan's leaders have arrested the leaders of LeT, and JeM, the two organizations named 
by India as responsible for the 13 December attack; frozen the financial assets and made large-scale 
arrests among members of these organizations; and closed down ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) offices 
on the Pakistani side of Kashmir.[6] While Indian officials have acknowledged the steps taken by 
Pakistan's government as positive, most remain skeptical about Pakistan's commitment to curb anti-India 
activities. Pakistani leaders continue to maintain that terrorism in other parts of the world cannot be 
equated with the violence in Kashmir, which they characterize as part of an ongoing struggle for freedom 
by the Kashmiri people against the Indian government. The Indian position, by contrast, is that the 
insurgency in Kashmir and other parts of India is a direct result of cross-border terrorism perpetrated by 
Pakistan. Indian officials insist that it is up to Pakistan to halt all manifestations of terrorism as a 
precondition to peace between the two countries, failing which the current military impasse will continue, 
and may lead to war. 
The United States and other members of the international community have urged both India and Pakistan 
to exercise restraint. U.S. Secretary of State Gen. Collin Powell has been in touch regularly with the 
leaders of both countries, and planned to convey U.S. concerns about the current security situation during 
his visit to the region on January 18. The Bush administration has recognized the right of the Indian 
government to resort to force for self-defense if diplomatic measures should fail. [7] At the same time, the 
U.S. government included Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed on its list of foreign terrorist 
organizations, and asked Pakistan's leaders to take tough measures against terrorist groups operating 
from their territory.[8] When British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited India and Pakistan in early January, 
he too urged President Musharraf to act against terrorists operating from Pakistan. 
Assessment 
The present build-up of military forces on both sides of the India-Pakistan border is unprecedented. 
Pakistan's leaders have indicated that a serious threat to Pakistan's national security by India's 
conventional forces could instigate use of nuclear weapons, which India says will prompt massive 
retaliation. 
Both countries have continued exploring diplomatic means to diffuse the crisis. International efforts so far 
have been partially successful in putting pressure on Pakistan to act against those terrorist groups named 
by India. Reports suggest, however, that these Jehadi cells enjoy support from elements of Pakistan's 
security forces and political establishment.[9] Dismantling them will demand a great deal of commitment 
and courage on the part of Pakistan's government. While President Musharraf is clearly in control of his 
country, renouncing support for Kashmiri militants will require a major shift in government policy, which in 
the long run could have repercussions for Pakistan's internal stability. Such a policy change, however, 
also would open up the possibility for renewed dialogue between the two countries, thereby defusing a 
potentially catastrophic situation. 
During the last two decades, terrorism has played an increasingly disruptive role in South Asia. Some of 
the reasons postulated for this are the United States' abandonment of Pakistan and Afghanistan at the 
end of the Cold War, the failure to resolve regional conflicts, the influence of religious radicalism on 
underdeveloped societies, and the negative aspects of globalization. Whatever the cause, terrorists from 
South Asia have affected the lives of millions of people all over the world, especially through the events of 
9/11, and their aftermath. The current crisis between India and Pakistan has been caused by terrorist 
elements who are believed to get sustenance from institutions within Pakistan. In furtherance of their 
efforts to root out terrorism, the international community should encourage the Pakistan government in its 
efforts to cooperate with India. India for its part must reciprocate Pakistan's actions and create avenues 
for a meaningful bilateral dialogue.  
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources. 
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